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This work assesses the evolving link between drone warfare and the concept of state 
sovereignty. In doing so, the paper critiques the existing realist and neo-realist discourses 
that maintain anthropocentric and state-centric assumptions in the analysis of not only the 
field of Security Studies, but International Relations as a whole. The phenomenon of drone 
warfare proves the opposite of such assumptions. The role of the state, and indeed the human, 
is continually decreasing with the involvement of hybrid actors. The drone is the 
embodiment of complex hybridity combining human and non-human actors alike. To better 
understand the contemporary execution of sovereignty, particularly in its role of maintaining 
the monopoly on violence, this paper will explore the premises of post-human perspectives 
in International Relations. In particular, this paper is inspired by the insights of Actor-
Network Theory (ANT), which emphasises equal analysis of human and non-human actors. 
Sovereignty remains a relevant topic, but through the involvement of hybrid actors, it is 
devolving into a seemingly arbitrary distribution of violence. The role of human actors in 
drone warfare is decreasing with the technological improvement of military drones and the 
military demand for increased drone autonomy. As a result, sovereignty, as far as the 
monopoly on violence is concerned, is de-humanised and no longer follows the realist and 
neo-realist presumptions.  
Abstrakt 
Tato magisterská práce se zabývá vyvíjejícím se spojení mezi válkou vedenou drony a 
konceptem státní suverenity. Ve svém průběhu tak tato práce obsáhne kritiku stávajících 
realistických a neorealistických diskurzů, jenž podpírají antropocentrické a státo-centrické 
pojetí analýzy nejen v oblasti bezpečnostních studií, ale i širšího pole mezinárodních vztahů. 
Dron samotný je poté ztělesněním komplexní hybridity, která v sobě kombinuje jak lidské, 
tak i nelidské aktéry. Ve snaze lépe porozumět současnému výkonu suverenity, zvláště pak 
její roli v udržování monopolu na násilí, prozkoumá tato práce premisy post-humanistických 
perspektiv v mezinárodních vztazích. Tato studie je pak inspirována především poznatky 
Teorie sítí aktérů (Actor-Network Theory – ANT), která zdůrazňuje rovnocenné postavení 
lidských i nelidských aktérů. Suverenita je nadále relevantním tématem, ale kvůli vlivu 
hybridních aktérů se zjevně přetváří v čím dál tím více arbitrární formu šíření násilí. Role 
lidských aktérů ve válce vedené drony se zmenšuje spolu s technologickým pokrokem ve 
 
 
vývoji válečných dronů a se stupňující se armádní poptávkou po zvyšování autonomie dronů. 
Ve svém výsledku je suverenita, alespoň co se týče monopolu na násilí, dehumanizována a 
neřídí se tak dle teoretických tezí realistů a neo-realistů. 
 
Keywords 
drone, sovereignty, geopolitics, realism, ANT 
 
Klíčová slova 
dron, suverenita, geopolitka, realismus, ANT 
 
Název práce 














































I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my supervisor Filip Vostal without whose 
patient support this work would not have been possible. If there is any quality to be found in 
this thesis, it had been achieved only with the help of my supervisor. In addition, I would 
like to thank the academic staff of Charles University for inspiring and nurturing my 
research. Last but not least, I would also like to extend my gratitude to my family, friends 
and my girlfriend Jessica for bearing the brunt of the stress this work at times induced in me. 
This work is dedicated to the memory of Josef Veselý who watched over me better than any 




Table of Contents 
Obsah 
Table of Contents ............................................................................................................ 8 
Introduction .................................................................................................................... 9 
Methodology and Research Questions ................................................................................. 13 
Chapter one: Drones in the regime of post-sovereignty ............................................ 14 
Towards hybrid realism .......................................................................................................... 16 
Post-humanist sensibilities in security discourse .................................................................. 20 
Beyond the Old Dualism(s) .................................................................................................... 22 
Chapter two:  Socio-Technological Implications of Hybrid Drone Warfare .......... 25 
The Necropolitical Drone ....................................................................................................... 26 
(Non-) Humans at War ........................................................................................................... 30 
Dronification of the Commons ............................................................................................... 33 
Chapter three: Decentring Human Agency .................................................................. 37 
The Resurgence of Dingpolitik .............................................................................................. 38 
Drone Agency .......................................................................................................................... 40 
Killing Matter .......................................................................................................................... 42 
Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 45 
Summary ....................................................................................................................... 47 






“A screaming comes across the sky. It has happened before, but there is nothing to 
compare it to now.” 
 




John Brennan, the now former director of CIA, stated in 2011 that drones are capable of 
inflicting zero civilian losses while simultaneously preserving the lives of American 
soldiers (Shane, 2011). According to such rhetoric, the military drone is a modern-day 
miracle machine, a wunderwaffe, which delivers the best of both worlds. The reality, 
however, proves different. Indeed, the reason behind such unprecedented efficiency of 
military drones may be the rather simplistic method of data collection concerning the 
casualties; all corpses that result from drone strikes are a priori considered to belong to 
terrorists, at least until proven (post-humously) innocent (Chamayou, 2015, p. 146). 
Snippets of information such as this provoked me to address drone warfare in the first 
place; what specifically picked my interest is the way how state sovereignty, a concept 
that is taken for granted in the field of Security Studies, is executed in such a cynical and 
arguably xenophobic manner that one has to wonder, if we current theoretical framework 
is still suitable to address the emergent challenges of drone warfare without simplifying 
the phenomenon. I arrived at the conclusion that the contemporary formulation of state 
sovereignty, which is largely constructed via realist and neo-realist frameworks, does no 
longer hold today for a thorough analysis of drone warfare. Instead, new approaches 
should be more readily adopted for the scope of analysis, especially those that are loosely 
associated with the post-human school of thought. Of these, those that integrate Actor-
Network Theory proved especially useful in my research of drone warfare and its relation 
to state sovereignty.  
 
What is so wrong with the conventional understanding of state sovereignty then? First of 
all, the very definition of sovereignty is subject to question. Indeed, ‘sovereignty’ is an 
ambiguous term, with no single empirically reliable definition. Rather, its usage evolved 
with historical practice. Despite a lack of a clear-cut definition, however, states assert 
sovereignty as an organizing principle. As Bartelson (1995, p. 16) observed: “we have in 
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recent years witnessed an increasing emphasis on [sovereignty’s] constitutive role in 
modern political reality as well as our understanding of it.” Instead of attempting to 
establish a ‘fit-all’ definition of sovereignty, this paper will investigate specifically the 
realist, and by association the neo-realist, stance towards sovereignty and the validity of 
this stance when confronted with the hybridity of the modern military drone warfare. The 
reason why the realist conception of sovereignty in particular will be subjected to critique 
is that the realist positions of anthropocentrism and state-centrism continue to dominate 
the field of International Relations (and Security Studies by association), to the detriment 
of other emerging perspectives, as Schandorf and Karatzogianni (2018) pointed out. 
Genealogically speaking, the origins of the realist concept of sovereignty can be traced to 
the work of Thomas Hobbes (Havercroft, 2012), specifically his political treatise 
Leviathan (1651). Especially Hobbes’ understanding of ‘anarchy’ has been hugely 
influential and continues to inform the (neo-) realist perspectives. White (2019) arrived 
at the conclusion that the intellectual history of sovereignty is responsible for the creation 
and maintenance of an ethnocentric normative hierarchy in the field of International 
Relations, which in turns propels the entrenched West-oriented notions of statehood itself. 
Any society that lies beyond the reach of the ‘civilized’ West is imperfect, flawed and 
fundamentally ‘other’. This is where drone warfare enters our analysis of sovereignty.  
 
Drones radically affect our understanding of sovereignty, not only within the discipline 
of International Relations, but also in ethical terms. We are all subjects of the droneworld. 
To the drone, we are nothing but a speck on the ground. It is no overstatement to claim 
that the future of warfare lies in drones. Globally, the military drone market was pegged 
at $9.9 billion USD in 2017 and is projected to grow to $15.2 billion by 2027 for a 
cumulative value of $113 billion (GlobalData, 2019). Appropriately enough, the 
academic interest in drones is steadily rising (see for example Fowler, 2014 or Franke, 
2018). By now, drones are by no measures unchartered territory when it comes to 
research; among other great works on the subjects, one can read Singer’s influential Wired 
for War (2009) or Chamayou’s more recent Drone Theory (2013). Yet, there are still 
notable gaps in contemporary research that need to be addressed, if only to prove that 
certain forms of academic discourse are no longer viable to engage in contemporary 
discussions. Notably, we are witnessing the growing divide between the concept of 
human-centred sovereignty and the proliferation of non-human actors in politics and 
warfare. While most of the debate about drones concerned the ethics of drones in warfare 
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(Keene, 2015, Fatic, 2017, Archambault, 2019), the implications for International 
Relations (IR), specifically from the scholarly perspective of Security Studies, have come 
into tentative consideration only in recent years. 
 
The paper will focus on sovereignty as a discursive concept, rather than as a legal term. 
The discussion surrounding the possible breach of international law by the intervention 
of drone strikes will be analysed only briefly in order to indicate the multidisciplinary 
scale the debate has assumed. Moreover, I will also explore the changing position of the 
human subject in drone warfare, using the discourses of post-humanism and more 
specifically Actor-Network Theory, or ‘ANT’ for short. ANT emphasises that society 
ought not to be represented according to the traditional scientific dualism of human actors 
and social structures, but that society is instead composed of human and non-human 
actors connected with each other through networks (Michael, 2016, p. 12). The theory 
does not neatly fit into conventional sociological discourse as it is not primarily concerned 
with social networks, but with expanded concepts of actors and networks. Bruno Latour, 
one of the chief theoreticians behind ANT, emphasised the distinction (1996, p. 369): 
[ANT] does not wish to add social networks to social theory, but to rebuild social theory 
out of networks.” For the purpose of the focus of this research, ANT proved to be an 
incredibly useful approach to deal with the complex realities of drone warfare. Instead of 
segregating actors because of their qualitative differences, ANT only takes into account 
he quantitative differences between the lengths of associations among actors (Michael, p. 
12). As a theory, ANT does not prioritise the agency of human actors over non-humans 
and in turn makes the conceptualisation of drone warfare more comprehensible and 
consistent. Because of its incredulity towards anthropocentrism, ANT falls under the 
rubric of post-human approaches, whose assumptions, particularly when it comes to 
material agency, differ radically from realism.   
 
With the evolution and proliferation of drones, we can see that unmanned warfare is just 
that; an asymmetric form of combat, where one side relies much less on the human 
element (if at all, as I will explore in this paper) than the other. If sovereignty has 
traditionally been interpreted as a concept that pertains exclusively to humans, and to the 
control of humans over others, then how can we reconcile such a notion with a 




In order to address the question of sovereignty this paper will first explore the unique 
properties of drones and the associated trends that drones bring with them. After all, one 
might ask why exactly is drone warfare so different from previous conventional forms of 
fighting. The answer may be in the much-commented potential for surveillance that 
drones possess, which in fact is so widespread at this point that a new phenomenon has 
emerged: ‘dronification’. By the term ‘dronification’ we follow here the influential text 
by Shaw and Akhter (2014) who described such a process as a practice of data-gathering 
and intervention, which reproduces a certain conduct of bureaucratised automated and 
targeted killing (ibid. 213-214). As this paper will examine, drones are not simply merely 
non-human actors; they combine both human and non-human properties at once, thus 
establishing themselves in a complex network of agendas. As the term ‘dronification’ 
suggests, the drone, or in other words, the hybrid, forms the central actant1 and facilitator 
of such a development, or rather, it is the sole idea of the drone itself that propels 
dronification forward. Shaw and Akhter’s text (2013) further gave rise to new insights 
within the emerging niche of ‘drone theory’. For example, Kaplan (2019) approached the 
drone as a technology of ‘atmospheric policing’, which converges with other assemblages 
of atmospheric violence to recreate neo-colonial hegemony.  
 
The practice and theory of the concept of state sovereignty are increasingly drifting apart. 
The Hobbesian monopoly on violence, traditionally believed to be concentrated in states 
formed by solely human actors, is eroding. This is so because the increasing autonomy of 
drones consistently blurs the distinction between human and machine, thus hijacking the 
anthropocentric discourses that still largely dominate social science research (Cudworth, 
2013). After all, drone warfare is heavily indebted to the recent developments of war 
technologies, particularly the implementation of algorithms, that betray their racist 
‘necropolitical’ agenda in targeting certain kinds of people, a reality that may have been 
responsible for the loss of hundreds, if not thousands of lives in the so called ‘collateral 
damage’. The concept of ‘necropolitics’ as developed by Achille Mbembe (2003) refers 
here to a specific form of biopower by which populations are exposed to death by 
powerful actors. 
 
1 ‘Actant’ here refers to a specific term related to the Actor Network Theory (ANT). The term actant is used 
within ANT somewhat interchangeably with the term ‘actor’, as the name of the theory suggests. An actant 
is a source of action, regardless of if the actant is human or non-human. Latour (1996: 373) summed up the 
definition of an actant thusly: “An “actor” in ANT is a semiotic definition – an actant –, that is something 




In the wider scope of things, drone warfare is yet another brutal chapter in the ongoing 
War on Terror. As such, drone warfare presents us with the continuation of certain trends 
that the War on Terror firmly established as part and parcel of its conduct; namely, the 
dehumanisation of humans, who are routinely described as ‘ants’ by the drone operators 
(Pilkington, 2015) due to their dot-like appearance on monitor screens, has reached a new 
height in the times of drones. Moreover, such dehumanisation corresponds with the 
breakdown of some paradigms that certain discourses in IR, namely realism and neo-
realism, held sacred. Specifically, anthropocentrism and state-centrism are on the losing 
side when it comes to the kind of warfare that drones in part constructed and highlighted. 
It is for this reason that this paper will also take on the duty of criticism the discourse of 
(neo-)realism that continues to largely dominate the discipline of IR in one form or 
another, to the detriment of other schools of thinking, such as the still largely incipient 
post-humanism that seems to be better suited to explain and assess the current 
conjunction. Yet, such a critique will be targeted towards greater understanding of the 
dronification of warfare, which forms the central focus of this thesis. 
 
Methodology and Research Questions 
 
The methodology of this paper follows that of a theoretical text. Because of the difficulty 
associated with obtaining primary data regarding drone warfare, I depend on secondary 
data. Statistics of drone strikes tend to be compiled by investigative journalists and much 
of the information regarding the actual conduct of military drones is classified. As such, 
my research engages the body of literature dedicated to the analysis of concepts that are 
relevant to the synthesis of the emerging understanding of sovereignty and drone warfare. 
In the particular case of my research, I deemed the theoretical approach to the analysis of 
drone warfare more suitable than an empirical approach as I am in large part exploring 
the issues of hybridity, which cannot be easily quantified. In fact, the desire to quantify 
is subject to my critique of the process of dronification. The limitation of my research is 
that I only researched drone warfare from the 9/11 attacks onwards without delving 
deeper into the development and use of military drones in the 20th century. The historical 
development of military drones, albeit a fascinating topic on its own, is beyond the scope 
of this paper. Because of the theoretical focus of my study, I did not carry out methods 
that would produce primary data. This paper also touches on the experience of drone 
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pilots who find themselves in peculiar hybrid assemblages. In the course of this paper, I 
will address the following questions: 
 
1) What constitutes the hybridity of military drones? 
2) How do post-humanist discourses perceive drone hybridity and how do these 
emergent findings compare with the established realist theory? 
3) What is the relationship between military drones and humans, as observed through 
the enforcement of US sovereignty?  
 
Chapter one: Drones in the regime of post-sovereignty 
 
If we accept the notion that drone technology is currently following the general trend of 
increasing technological autonomy from human command (Dyndal, Berntsen and 
Johansen, 2017), then does that make the autonomous drone a moral agent? If a drone 
kills a civilian, does it bear the blame? If not, then who does? The manufacturer? The 
programmer of the drone’s algorithm? Is a drone a sovereign? These questions only 
gesture towards the problematics of drone warfare. For example, drones are currently 
being tested for use by police forces (Fleming, 2019). It would also seem that the debate 
surrounding the extent of drone autonomy lags behind the current practise. Military 
drones already come equipped with Automated Target Recognition (ATR) systems, 
which facilitate their function of distinction. It is then the drone that quite literally defines 
the objects of the battlespace and without acknowledging this factor, commentators may 
fall into the trap of not necessarily underestimating the autonomy of the drone, but 
overestimating the role of the drone operator – the system of distinction already 
hybridizes the mechanical and organic (Allinson, 2015, p. 10). A hybridity emerges, not 
in any abstract or virtual sense, but in a very concrete manifestation that underpins 
contemporary networks of digital information. Poster (2004) was early in his 
identification of ‘humachines’ which constitute for him the aspects of ‘new globalism’ 
that followed the 9/11 attacks.  Although Poster’s arguments rest largely on the literature 
of Hardt and Negri and their hugely influential Empire (2000), his definition of 
‘humachines’ resembles rather the language of scholars dealing with ANT (T.W. Luke, 
1997; Brooks and Atkinson, 2004). Critically then, for Poster a humachine does not 
designate merely a prothesis or an extension, but, in his own words: “an intimate mixing 
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of human and machine that constitutes an interface outside the subject/object binary.” Is 
a drone then not precisely such a ‘humachine’, operating within the realm of new 
globalism that no longer rests on territorial divisions that were so critical to the nation 
state?  
 
The post-humanist turn does come with a set of factors that affect our perception of the 
human element. One such factor is the progressing ‘anthropophobia’, the fear or perhaps 
rather disdain for humans. While inventors and engineers first saw drones as ‘beasts of 
burden’ which had to be restrained and ‘domesticated’ by human control (Mindell, 1996, 
p. 206 in Packer and Reeves, 2013), such an anthropocentric view is currently receding. 
Humans are by their very default prone to a plethora of factors that might negatively 
affect their performance. They may be subject to fear, stress, irrationality and a great 
number of psychological and ideological influences that might also lead to critical failure. 
The common phrase ‘To err is human’ has acquired a whole new disturbing character. 
The drone, however, does not suffer of any of psychological factors that humans do. 
Increasingly, the military staff is recognising that mission failures during drone strikes 
are caused by human involvement rather than machine malfunctions (Packer and Reeves, 
2013). In the age of drone warfare, human qua human combat is becoming an obsolete 
technology of war (ibid. p. 327-328) mainly because of the persistent human unreliability. 
The introduction of the drone, however, ‘solves’ the human inefficiency. The current 
trend seems to indicate that the autonomy of drones will steadily increase due to the 
incessant ‘latency’ of response between the drone and the drone operator (ibid.). Already, 
it would seem, the US military regards increasing autonomy of the drone as granted. This 
may be because of the special status drones have come to occupy in the American 
military; the drone is an object of fetish (Shaw and Akhter, 2012, p. 1492). In many ways 
it constitutes the ideal soldier, devoid of any human deficiencies that might impede the 
success of its mission.2 
 
While the military ‘superiority’ remains a rather ulterior motive for the expansion and 
proliferation of drone technologies, the public usually receives a different justification. 
The former CIA director John Brennan addressed the reliance on drones by appealing to 
the ethical dimension of drone strikes, claiming that because of their increased precision 
 
2 For a more general analysis of the effects of 21st century capitalism on the breakdown of the human 
condition see Jonathan Crary’s 24/7: Late Capitalism and the Ends of Sleep (2013). 
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(superiority to human agents) drones can target terrorists on the ground way more 
accurately that manned aircrafts without inflicting collateral damage (Chesney, 2012). A 
line is thus drawn between drone ethics and drone precision, both of which supposedly 
make combat practically surgical in scope. Espinoza (2018, p. 379) noted that the ‘drone 
discourse’ is continuing in the colonial tradition, borrowing much of its rhetoric from past 
civilizational ‘missions’ for the subjugation of the Other. A difference emerges between 
the ‘civilized’ American forced with their advanced drone technologies, and the 
‘barbaric’ terrorists, still clinging to antiquated forms of combat. From this perspective, 
it would almost seem that the high-tech military drone is the ‘reply’ to the challenge of 
terrorism, among other problems of national and indeed global security. As Singer (2009, 
p. 63) remarked, the drone becomes “our answer to the suicide bomber”. The emphasis 
here is this; only a machine incapable of fear is able to fully counter someone who is not 
(at least apparently) afraid of his or her own death. Within such a discourse, oriental 
fanaticism meets Western rationality, or perhaps irrationality. 
 
Towards hybrid realism 
 
In my analysis of drone warfare, examination of sovereignty plays a crucial role. The 
concept of sovereignty itself has undergone a thorough inspection, especially by scholars 
associated with the realist and neo-realist schools of thought (Boucher, 1998; Osiander, 
2001; Havercroft, 2012). Currently, sovereignty is being re-assessed yet again due to 
evolving understanding of networks between human and non-human agents. Kindervater 
(2016, p. 209) stated that the American use of drone strikes, particularly under the Obama 
Administration, established a new kind of sovereignty, which radically differs from the 
classical understanding of the term within IR. This drone-powered sovereignty is “mobile 
and ephemeral,” ultimately replacing the conventions of state sovereignty that refers to a 
fixed and static demarcations of territory (ibid.). In practical terms, the use of drones by 
the US military has been often cited as a violation of sovereignty of other nations, 
especially when it comes to the drone strikes in Pakistan’s region of the Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA, merged with the administrative province of Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa as of 2018). Some supporters of drone strikes in FATA argue that the 
killing is justified insofar as the targeted people in a given territory are not under 
“effective control” of neither the host state nor the targeting state, meaning that 
international law does not apply (Paust, 2013). Paust also confirms in his advocacy for 
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drone strikes the aforementioned morbidity of necropolitics: “those who are being 
targeted, for example, by a high flying drone in a foreign country will not be protected 
under the general human right to life, because they are not within the actual power or 
effective control of the targeting state” [emphasis added]. In effect, of course, the killing 
that results from drone strikes is strictly extra-judicial, prompting a fierce discussion of 
the legality of drone-administered executions. Although this paper will not specifically 
focus on the legal aspects of drone strikes, the factor of legality is still worth bringing up 
as it contributes to our assessment of sovereignty.3 By deploying drones to the remote 
areas of Pakistan, the US military is at once acting as both the prosecutor and the 
executioner in places where rule of law is suspended. Yousaf (2014) speculated that the 
US is exploiting the institutional and political weakness of Pakistan to impose its will in 
the country. However, Pakistan is only one case study among many, and its inclusion in 
this brief analysis aims to highlight some of the impacts that drone warfare brings with it 
in practice. 
 
The extra-judicial aspect of drones is disturbing enough to provide enough material for a 
wholly separate thesis and admittedly, this paper only refers to the (non-) legality of drone 
strikes to better illustrate the way in which concepts such as sovereignty are warped 
during the ‘drone age’. Yet, these illustrative examples are necessary in order to showcase 
the twisted effects drones have on sovereignty, where theory does not entirely correspond 
to practice. This paper is not trying to argue that sovereignty becomes irrelevant in the 
case of drone warfare; on the contrary: we can observe a trend, where sovereignty is 
effectively reversing sovereignty to a more brutal and basic form. The targets of drone 
have no chance of surrender, most of the time, their identity is unknown and drone strikes 
completely ignore any semblance of the presumption of innocence (Calhoun, 2018). In 
other words, drones deliver practically despotic, arbitrary “justice”, which is not 
restrained by any institutional framework; procedures and methods of drone targeting and 
profiling are kept secret from the public by the US military (ibid. p.  359). Drone warfare 
does not take into account any semblance of habeas corpus (ibid. p. 369), there is no 
recognition of the sanctity of human lives, and political dissent is re-interpreted as 
terrorism; only in Yemen between 1,020 and 1,389 people have died due to drone strikes 
since 2001, of which between 174 and 225 were civilians, including between 44 and 50 
 
3 For a studies dealing with the legality of drone strikes, see for example Brooks (2013) or Rae (2014) 
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children (Serle, 2016). Effectively then, the incarcerations of terrorist suspects during the 
G.W. Bush presidency turned into outright killing during the Obama era. Under the guise 
of the ‘War on Terror’, individuals are, in strict sense of the word, murdered without any 
right of appeal. Without much exaggeration, this regression returns state sovereignty to a 
primordial, essentially medieval stage of development. 
 
The current scholarship in IR and Security Studies dealing with sovereignty draws heavily 
from the approach of the realists and their respective successors, hence the underlying 
dependence on state-centrism and anthropocentrism. Sovereignty is formulated through 
these specific approaches that historically emerged from Hobbesian thought and the 
Westphalian settlement at the end of the Thirty Years War. Malette and Stoett (2018, p. 
113) linked the development of state sovereignty with the concept of free will, which 
played a key role in nation-building as well as the inception of modernity. In the West, 
this frequently meant promotion of arguments for self-determination, cultural 
homogenization and monopolization of violence just to name a few, coupled with 
continual institutionalization of centralized political power (ibid.). In practice, state 
sovereignty was frequently utilised as tool for uninterrupted extermination of the Other, 
be it along ethnic, religious, cultural or nationalistic lines defined by the majority.  
 
Realism tends to simplify sovereignty to a neat model that is entirely fuelled by the human 
and the state when in fact sovereignty works in far more complex ways. This can be seen 
in how Waltz (1979, p. 96) explains sovereignty: “To say that a state is sovereign means 
that it decides for itself how it will cope with its internal and external problems […]” 
Does this elegant, yet rather simple definition still apply in today’s world of algorithmic 
warfare? Understandably for its own time, Waltzian neorealism takes the human as the 
measure of all things. Neorealism understands war as a struggle strictly between humans 
and waged by humans. This paradigm, however, is breaking down. Peter Singer (2009, 
p. 510-511) expressed the sentiment perfectly in his seminal work Wired for War:  
 
“History may look back at this period as notable for the simultaneous loss of the state’s 
roughly 400-year-long monopoly over which groups could go to war and humanity’s loss 




This paper does not argue that sovereignty as a concept has lost relevance. Yet, the forms 
of hybridity we are witnessing in IR warrant a re-assessment of the conventional 
conception of sovereignty. Nowhere is this clearer than in the problematic of drones. 
Reports suggest that the US military frequently resorts to contracting out drone operations 
to private companies (Hennigan, 2015; Trevithick, 2018). Non-state actors are then 
increasingly proliferating the military sector, which in turn leads to unprecedented 
chanced in warfare itself. As Maryann K. Cusimano Love (2019, p. 296-297) observed: 
“Drones democratize war, allowing a wider number of actors to project violence across 
borders, without armies, navies, and air forces, and in ways that may evade detections 
and identification.” While the term ‘democratisation of war’ may sound like an 
oxymoron, this is precisely the reality we find ourselves in. Drones decentralise and quite 
literally deterritorialise warfare. Wars today and in the foreseeable future will be fought 
by and though military hybrids, which inevitably require complex actor-networks.  
 
Despite the objections of the realists, sovereignty has undergone a marked change and 
the theoretical frameworks that once may have defined and formulated the concept 
sufficiently now apply only in part. Love (2019, p. 417) asked the pertinent question: 
“How many planks must be pulled for us to recognise sovereignty today as something 
different than sovereignty in the past?” At the same time, we also have to take into account 
the other side of the argument, which would state that realism has been vindicated by 
drone warfare. Indeed, the recklessness with which particularly the US anti-terrorist 
policy has been pursued would be in favour of some form of vindication of the realist 
argument that states seek to maximise their power. However, it seems that the reference 
object of the ‘state’, which realism sees as anthropocentric, is no longer the same in the 
‘drone age’. Notably, many of the realist assumptions concerning anarchy, such as we 
can see in Kenneth Waltz’s neorealist Man, State and War (1959) depend on 
anthropocentrism, be it because of the explanations based on human nature or on man-
made institutions and ultimately structures. Perhaps a new window of academic research 
is opening, one that would try to theorise some form of ‘hybrid realism’, but at the 
moment, realist literature is lagging behind in this aspect.  
 
The reality, which the realists claim to represent, seems increasingly distant from the 
theoretical construction. Indeed, the human decision-making already seems ill-suited to 
the current combat environment (Tucker, 2016), which is perhaps nowhere clearer that in 
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drone warfare. This is largely the result of the interconnectedness between globalization 
and what we perceive as state sovereignty, the two factors that are often poised against 
each other in the media. John Agnew (2009, p. ix) indicated a more accurate way of 
assessing sovereignty: 
 
“Effective sovereignty is always and everywhere exercised in relation to a variety of 
actors – state-based, corporate, societal, and so on – who can be enrolled in its exercise 
even as they share in its effects at home and spread its impacts far and wide beyond the 
bounds of any state’s territory sensu stricto.”  
 
Although Agnew is referring here to the disappearing line between globalization and state 
sovereignty (which perhaps may have been imaginary this whole time), his statement 
applies with eerie relevance to drone warfare as well. Specifically, what we are faced with 
is the rising dependence on non-human actors and their corresponding levels of 
intervention in matters of human life and death. Life, however, does not seem to possess 
an absolute value within the hybrid apparatus of drone warfare. In particular, ‘Oriental’ 
lives of the nameless and faceless targets on the ground are situated at the very opposite 
end of susceptibility to death than the untouchable drone operators. In the following 
section, I will investigate the difference between the ‘civilised West’ and the ‘uncivilised 
Other’ while paying special attention to the sociological dimension of drone warfare.   
 
Post-humanist sensibilities in security discourse 
 
In the simplest of terms, post-humanism seeks to go in its analysis beyond the limitations 
imposed by the human-centred approaches. By its reliance on concepts such as hybridity, 
heterogeneity and cyborgs, post-humanism attempts to offer new perspectives on the 
human subject, and indeed social world as a whole. At its core then, post-humanism 
investigates the various relationships between humans and other ‘things’ in the era of the 
so called- Anthropocene; the era in which human influence has come to dominate the 
world. How such an era defines our relationship with non-human and even non-living 
‘agents’ is a question that post-human scholars continue to grapple with. Admittedly then, 
post-humanism is not a unitary academic perspective but rather a set of at times 
conflicting views. Yet, it seems appropriate that we can utilize the umbrella term of ‘post-
human’ to refer to the scholarly opposition in the social sciences to anthropocentric 
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perspectives that neglect to analyse more complex focus on the networks between humans 
and non-humans.  
 
As the argument of this thesis goes, what sets military drones apart from other 
conventional weapons is their ever-increasing hybridity, which constitutes a typical point 
of interest for post-humanists. We can then begin this analytical and discursive section 
by placing drones within the context of International Relations, which form the wider 
discipline for the field of Security Studies. The post-humanist perspective in International 
Relations (IR) came to rely heavily on the ‘New Materialist Turn’ (Lundborg and 
Williams, 2014), which emphasizes the increasingly techno-social dimension of the field 
while at the same time addressing the human limitation. In analysing the complex 
adaptive systems that are at play in IR, posthumanism has the potential to provide a more 
comprehensive analysis than constructivism, while avoiding the determinism that 
characterizes (neo)-realism. We do not have to go far then to find sources critical of the 
prevailing hegemony of current anthropocentric and realist paradigms in academic 
literature. Schandorf and Karatzogianni, for example, expressed their view that the 
traditional IR theories “[reduce] complexity to an idealistic simplicity in an unrealistic 
realism” (2018, p. 91). Instead of merely accepting the gross simplification of the state 
entity, the post-humanist perspectives ask the questions of how borders are drawn in the 
first place and how are actors and agents defined (ibid.).  
 
The ironic ‘unrealism of realism’ is thus a trend that deserves a fair critique; Oren (2009) 
for example indicated that realism’s epistemological limitations lie in its naturalistic and 
positivist strains and proposed instead Weberian ideal-typical methodology that could 
provide a better foundation for research. Nonetheless, while realism has been undergoing 
its own re-assessment for some time now (Gellman, 1988), one of its chief aims continues 
to be the opposition to political idealism, at least in regard to the tradition laid out by 
Hans Morgenthau in his Politics Among Nations (1948). For the purpose of this work, 
such a framework of discussion is unsatisfactory for this thesis seeks to understand and 
critique the inherent and indeed troublesome hybridity of drone warfare, which arguably 
presents to us an unprecedented phenomenon of the use of power that eludes the 




The claim that the realist discourse is not suitable for this work, or indeed for any 
comprehensive study of hybridity and actor-networks, is not mentioned here arbitrarily. 
The problem of not only security studies and international relations but political science 
as a whole seems to be the ‘matter-of-factness’ of the realist theorems that pervade the 
field. Despite the emergence various schools and approaches to IR, the debates within the 
discipline have been dominated by the ‘foundational myth’ (Cudworth and Hobden, 2012, 
p. 39). This ‘myth’ concerns the illusion that the naive idealism of the interwar years was 
replaced by concrete realism of the post-war era, while in reality, there is scant evidence 
that the interwar discourse had anything to do with perceived the idealism (Schmidt, 
1998, p. 229-230). As a result, realism found its validation after World War II, when the 
straw man of idealism was dismissed as a debunked error of judgement. As a result of the 
pervasive influence of realism, whose dogmas exist even outside of its own school of 
thought, Smith (2000, p. 379) wrote that the discipline of international relations is 
pervaded also by state-centrism and positivism. Within our area of interest, post-human 
discourses then strive for non-anthropocentric approaches to security by stressing what 
Schwartz (2015) termed “the cornucopia of non-human and technological entities that 
shape our political ecology, and, in turn, condition our notions of security and ethics.” 
 
Beyond the Old Dualism(s) 
 
Let me turn more towards the technological questions concerning drone warfare. 
Conventionally, technology is only approached via its instrumentality. The drone, 
according to such a view, merely exists as a non-human means to a human end. However, 
such a simplification masks the far more complex phenomena of intentional forces of 
assemblage mobilizing motivated agents (Cudworth, 2011, p. 96). Human beings as such 
are then to be considered the ultimate conscious and motivated agents and yet, so many 
structural factors that affect human behaviour such as ideology prove that at times, 
humans too ‘revert’ to a state of intentionality rather than motivation. The inner 
contradictions contained within the assumption of binary agency-less machines and 
agency-possessing humans starts to breakdown once we consider the modern status of 
sovereignty. This is so because the very notion of ‘sovereignty’ which pervades the 
disciplines of social sciences is fundamentally based on Western epistemic authority 
(White, 2019). Sovereignty thus continues to be understood in Hobbesian fashion; that 
which does not correspond to the Eurocentric ontological positions of sovereignty is 
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classed as ‘the Other’ and is appropriately dismissed as inferior in terms of normative 
hierarchy. As we shall see in this chapter, drones are able to ‘dronify’ the capacity of the 
outwardly anthropocentric state and in doing so, they either underpin or undermine the 
validity and indeed the legitimacy of the established concept of sovereignty. 
 
The emerging dependence on the drone perhaps marks the end of late Anthropocene. 
Much like Bentham’s oft quoted Panopticon, the Drone has become a metaphor; the 
Drone has become an ideal proxy (Armand, 2018, p. 2). Late Anthropocene is 
accompanied by increasing caution for humanism, which is in its very foundation based 
on the distinction between science and metaphysics, technological progress and ideology 
(ibid.). The convergence coincides with the gradual breakdown of the constructed concept 
of modernity that underpins the current academic discipline of IR; the Cartesian 
separations of mind and body, war and peace, originating from the dualism of René 
Descartes and the political order of the Westphalian peace respectively (both of which 
are the products of the 17th century) are progressively dissolving (Davies, 2018, p. 10). 
Indeed, the current mainstream understanding of International Relations and by 
association Security Studies still relies on anthropocentric and Eurocentric modes of 
thought (Vasilaki, 2012). This mismatch between theory and practice, however, becomes 
all the clearer once we consider Bruno Latour’s argument (1993) that we have never been 
modern. While we will come back to Latour’s work in the later sections of this paper, for 
now we can address his hypothesis that the division between ‘culture’ and ‘nature’ is an 
artificial one. To surpass this dualistic worldview, we need to attune our study with what 
Latour called the ‘process of translation’ (ibid. p. 10-11), which actively creates mixtures 
between various ontologies regardless of whether they belong to the realm culture or 
nature. In contrast to the ‘process of purification’ (ibid.), which seeks the very opposite, 
that is the separation of beings and creation of distinct ontological zones, translation is 
then a process of hybridization. Latour’s argument goes that we are only truly ‘modern’ 
once we consider these two processes separately, which in turns enables the smooth 
proliferation of hybrids.  
 
At first sight, the use of drones seems like nothing new. At its most elementary level, the 
drone continues in the evolution of war technologies which aim to increase the physical 
and in fact emotional distance between the combatants (Greenwald, 2012). This evolution 
of warfare dates back to the invention of bow and arrow, if not the first makeshift 
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weapons, which mediated physical contact between two combatants. A well-known 
portrayal of this development is to be seen in the first scene of Stanley Kubrick’s 2001: 
A Space Odyssey, where a group of apes figures out with the seeming help of an alien 
monolith that animal bones could be used as clubs. However, the arrival of the Drone 
indicates a break in the evolution of weaponry and killing. In his Terror from the Air 
(2009), Peter Sloterdijk expounded the thesis, that the 20th century well and truly began 
only in 1915 with the introduction of war gas by the German military, which meant a shift 
in warfare from targeting the body to targeting the enemy’s environment (ibid. p. 14). 
While Sloterdijk talks specifically about the use of gas in warfare, the introduction of 
drones is very much similar; like war gas, drones seize the ‘enemy’s’ environment, 
perhaps even more thoroughly than gas, which at the end of the day, is vulnerable to wind 
conditions way more than any modern model of a military drones.4 What is more, thanks 
to the proliferation of drones in warfare, war itself is no longer contained within a given 
territorially delineated space; war has become globalised in the strictest sense of the word. 
Furthermore, the War on Terror, started by the US president G. W. Bush in 2001, does 
not seem to have an end in sight. Drones, being increasingly essential in the conduct of 
the conflict, further perpetuate it, in part because of the obscuring of the ethical barrier of 
sacrificing lives of US soldiers. Kenneth Waltz (1979, p. 102) could still write decades 
ago:  
 
“Among states, the state of nature is the state of war. This is meant not in the sense that 
war constantly occurs but in the sense that, with each state deciding for itself whether or 
not to use force, war may at any time break out.” 
 
In the Waltzian understanding of war, there is a clear dichotomy between war and peace, 
with war being a clearly delineated period with given territorial space. In the era of 
dronified conflict, this no longer holds correct. As David Gregory argued (2014, p. 7), in 
drone warfare we are encountering a war that establishes a new dimension of spatiality 
that further combines with the perpetual temporality of the War on Terror. War waged 
through and by drones is no longer only a ‘forever war’, it is also an ‘everywhere war’.  
 
4 For a more in-depth study of the effects of wind conditions on drones, see Wang et. al. (2019) 
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Chapter two:  Socio-Technological Implications of Hybrid Drone 
Warfare 
 
As I indicated in the previous chapter, the conception of sovereignty as well as of the field 
of security broadly conceived is still held back primarily by anthropocentric prejudices. 
With the study of drones, however, there is little option to retreat into old paradigms. The 
drone’s ability to project itself into established discourses, to make us rethink the very 
fundamentals of warfare as combat of humans versus humans, is a testament to its 
material agency. For now, let me consider some of the features of drone warfare.  
 
We tend to conceive of drones only as their physical manifestations in the skies. In fact, 
drone warfare and drones themselves imply a vast network of infrastructure, particularly 
in terms of bureaucracy whose introduction arguably normalised the practice of targeted 
killing (Jaffer, 2010, p. 10). Such a normalization, however, is not limited only to warfare, 
but extends also into civilian life. This is the process of ‘dronification’. It is a process that 
reduces human beings into data, or worse, into dehumanised objects, literal ‘ants’ on the 
monitor of the drone operator. For Shaw and Akhter (2014, p. 214), dronification signifies 
not only the rapid bureaucratisation of state violence, but also the evaporation of 
sovereign power from uniformed military to the hands of the CIA and special forces, the 
technopolitical transformations enabled by the Predator drone and last but not least the 
individualisation of targets, who could be killed without further approval.  
 
Drones, being hybrid actors themselves, provide us with a distinct vision of the reality 
around them. This is the ‘drone gaze’, which in effect creates zones of exception where 
even extra-judicial killings administered by drones themselves are de facto permitted. The 
alleged precision of drones begins to fall apart once we assess the necropolitical logic of 
drones. The term ‘necropolitics’ politics that decides who gets to live and who has to die 
for the preservation of those deemed worthy to live. Suffice to say that necropolitics, 
albeit being a rather new area of study, has already shed much some light onto our 
understanding of drone killings. Furthering the scope of Foucauldian thought, 
necropolitics reverses the focus of the original concept of biopolitics; instead of life, the 
primary focus is now death. Drone warfare has the strange effect of alienating human 
beings, and especially the drone pilots themselves, from the theatres of war, thus 




The Necropolitical Drone 
 
The field of study examining necropolitics emerges largely from Achille Mbembe’s 
seminal work on the topic (2011), building on the Foucauldian notion of biopower that 
continues to be frequently utilised in the contemporary studies of counterinsurgency. 
While at the moment, necropolitics as a concept is relatively unknown among the 
academic and lay communities, it will doubtlessly rise with prominence in the near future 
together with the escalating production of military drones. After all, the potential of 
drones for military use is a source of great inspiration for armies around the world. In the 
coming decade, an estimated $98 billion is expected to be spent globally in the military 
drone market with the US leading the group in terms of investment (Harper, 2020). It is 
perhaps worth noting that the military drone market is dominated by four companies, 
these being General Atomics, Northrop Grumman, Textron and Boeing (Peck, 2016). 
Drones, as indicated above, present a brand-new way of warfare, practically outsourcing 
the act of killing to a machine. Herein lies the troubling reality of drone warfare; who 
ultimately decides who dies and who lives? The popular discourse often tends to 
ironically humanise drones, appealing to their lack of emotions, which therefore 
minimises the danger of inflicting civilian casualties and unnecessary suffering. The 
drone is supposed to be the ultimate rational actor, devoid of human prejudices and 
deficiencies.  
 
However, as we will see, much of this depends on the way of how the drone sees reality, 
on the ‘drone gaze,’ which Wall and Monahan (2011, p. 246) called perhaps more 
appropriately the ‘drone stare‘. Somewhat tellingly, the new the drone video system used 
by the US Air Force is called ‘Gorgon Stare’ (Johnson and Wald, 2017). Human beings 
subjected to such a stare are immediately dehumanised, becoming nothing but targets. It 
would thus appear that the drone’s algorithms, supposedly precise targeting technologies, 
continue to be dictated by very much human-made orientalist discourses. The drone’s 
gaze in this sense becomes necropolitical, as it “renders the entire military-aged male 
population a threat worthy of being put to death” (Espinoza, 2018, p. 388-389). 
Necropolitics then defines the very logic of the drone, they form the algorithm of the 
drone. Being necropolitical, this algorithm is however a priori discriminatory in its 
agenda, which in turn makes it a suitable technology of war administration. Foucault 
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(2003, p. 256) himself stated: “Once the State functions in the biopower mode, racism 
alone can justify the murderous function of the State”.  
 
The algorithmic culture that is found within military drones is a further element to the 
already hazy picture of the drone hybrid. The drone itself assumes a form of a literal actor-
network, constituting an intersection of various human and non-human agencies. With 
the constant appeal to security, the only result that military drones achieve through their 
enforcement of US ethereal sovereignty is the death of more and more people every year. 
Even with the war on terror on mind, it would seem that instead of the bleeding edge 
praises drone acquire thanks to their coordinated performance (as opposed to their actual 
human operators) the one adjective that seems to sum up military drone is ‘inhuman’. 
Drones, despite being non-human actants, constantly display severe levels of what we 
could call by analogy “techno-misanthropy”. The drone is in constant conflict with the 
human, who is progressively becoming an obstacle to the increasing drone autonomy. 
The algorithmic logic of drones is far from objective, instead it demonstrates constant 
gendered and racial biases that ultimately result in the ever-increasing body counts of the 
collateral victims of the War on Terror. However, one cannot help but to think that instead 
of the War on Terror, we have entered a new phase; that of the War on the Human. 
 
Necropolitics establishes the distinction between those who are worthy of life and those 
who will be subjected to death. Dronification in this sense is the crucial element of such 
a distinction; the drone surveys and audits not only individuals, but whole communities 
and populations. Dillon and Reid (2009) came to the conclusion that the War on Terror 
constitutes a “liberal way of war”, where war is waged on the ‘human’ in order to protect 
and preserve the ‘biohuman’. The War on Terror thus changes the very subject of war 
itself and together with it the concept of state sovereignty is inevitably amended. 
Although the current practice of drone war-making is heavily informed by the liberal 
defence of the biohuman subject, this does not validate or vindicate the realist mode of 
war, where war is justified waged in the name of state sovereignty. As Dillon and Reid 
(ibid. p. 36) stressed: “To indict the liberal way of war for its contribution to the 
predicament of the very subject –biohumanity – in whose name it wages war is not to 
overlook the horror for which states, among other actors, have regularly been 
responsible.” This remark just goes to say that a critique of the liberal globalization of 
 
 28 
warfare though the use of drone technology does not necessarily mean that one is 
promoting the (neo-)realist standpoint.  
 
Hence, the link between sovereignty and the use of military drones brings with it some 
troubling trends. Indeed, Allinson (2015, p. 9) commented that it could be possibly 
assumed that drones merely mark the international turn of the passage of sovereign power 
to disciplinary power, which marks the emergence of biopolitics. Yet, it is precisely here 
where we find one of the unique properties of drones. Allinson (ibid. p. 10) states that 
necropolitics provide us with the crucial bind between the two concepts of sovereignty 
and biopolitics, because the necropolitical critique identifies racism not only as an 
abstraction, but as a technology of power that “unites the exercise of sovereign power 
with technologies of the surveillance, auditing and management of populations” (ibid.). 
The drone’s gaze is biopolital, but its function extends into necropolitics; the war drone 
does not save lives, it kills in such a way that is only possible thanks to recent 
technological advancements. Although the technology of the drone was available in 
rather experimental uses for much of the 20th century, the development of the ‘killing 
drone’ dates back to the 2001, which arguably marked the beginning of a paradigm shift 
in the conduct of warfare (Williams, 2013, p. 24). This was the year when the US military 
managed to fit a Hellfire missile onto the RQ-1 Predator drone, which then successfully 
fired the missile at a target on the ground without damaging itself in the process. The 
writer Brian Gysin Williams noted just what this innovation in warfare meant: “It was a 
revolutionary moment in the history of aerial warfare. The unmanned reconnaissance 
drone had become a killer.” (ibid.).  
 
In this sense, state sovereignty assumes a particularly grim necropolitical character. The 
drone becomes a tool for swift and effective execution of biopower. Drone warfare brings 
into spotlight perhaps the greatest failure of contemporary humanism. With surprising 
ease, human beings may cease to be seen as lives that are worth respect and preservation 
and become threats that are disposable at will. Judith Butler stated this perhaps the best 
in her Frames of War: 
 
“Those we kill are not quite human, and not quite alive, which means that we do not feel 
the same horror and outrage over the loss of their lives as we do over the loss of those 




What is at stake here is the responsibility of state sovereignty for deliberate and at times 
wanton killing. Foucault (2003) noted, sovereign biopower is only legitimate as long as 
it preserves life and as long as it manages to present itself as being necessary to successful 
reproduction of life. This legitimacy is consequently derived from the orientalist-
mandated racism (Espinoza, 2018, p. 383) which determines who can live and who has 
to die. Such a necropolital logic follows closely the principles of the Powell Doctrine, 
which advocated for the nearly oxymoronic war without casualties (by this of course the 
doctrine meant American casualties). While the capability of conducting warfare with 
minimal own casualties is one of the strongest arguments of pro-drone advocates, such 
an innovation of remote-controlled killing also carries with it deeply disturbing 
ideological considerations. Žižek remarked that our era of late capitalism is still typified 
by the ‘passion for the Real’, an ontological legacy of the 20th century. As Žižek 
commented on such a condition: 
 
„If, then, the passion for the Real ends up in the pure semblance of the spectacular effect 
of the Real, then, in an exact inversion, the ‘postmodern’ passion for the semblance ends 
up in a violent return to the passion for the Real.“ (2002, p. 23) 
 
By the ‘return of the Real’, Žižek had in mind the 9/11 attacks, which marked a certain 
end of the End of History in American political and intellectual perception of itself. In 
regard to drone warfare, what we are ultimately faced with is precisely the sublimation 
of the passion for the “spectacular effect of the Real”, the product (US intervention in the 
Middle East) deprived of its substance (loss of the lives of American soldiers). Moreover, 
the lack of the risk of losing lives also removes a certain factor of deterrence, a natural 
human repulsion towards violence and gore, which normally poses as a considerable 
barrier towards starting wars (Sharkey, 2010, p. 371). If we follow the Žižekian line of 
thinking, which on its own is informed by Jean Baudrillard, then our understanding of the 
relationship between war and drones begins to resemble that of between art and kitsch. 
Just like kitsch aims at simulating the effect of art, just so then do drones simulate the 
effect of war. Indeed, the crossover with the field of aesthetics is certainly not of 
secondary or circumstantial importance but plays another key role in the split between 
the subject and object that underpins discriminatory killing of human targets by drones. 
Donna Haraway (1988, p. 581) described what she called the ‘god-trick’ of visual 
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perception, meaning the ability of “seeing everything from nowhere.” The deadly drone 
strikes are motivated by a visual logic that marks the terrorist object, which is defined the 
algorithm in place defines as any male of adult age. As Haraway (ibid. p. 586) somewhat 
prophetically wrote: “The Western eye has fundamentally been a wandering eye, a 
traveling lens.” In the following chapter, we will investigate how proliferation of non-
human ‘wandering eyes’ affects the field of warfare itself. 
 
(Non-) Humans at War 
 
Effectively, the realist schools of thought conceived of war as an undifferentiated 
phenomenon, one that is self-explanatory in character. Realism focused on the reasons 
for war, on the explanation of the behaviour of states and their reasoning for engaging in 
conflicts. To give only a short account of some of the studies in this vein we can mention 
Waltz (1979) with his innovation in neo-realism, James (1995) who linked rational-
choice theories to system structures or Mearsheimer (2001) with his oft-criticised concept 
of offensive realism. What these approaches have in common, however, is their reliance 
on the human rational actor. As I indicated in the examination of post-humanism, the 
discipline still takes the human to be the measure of all things. Yet, the network of 
agencies in drone warfare indicates a much more violent hybridity in place. 
 
The logistical apparatus behind the drone itself allows for a potential omnipresence thanks 
to the dronified surveillance network. Relatively recently, we could have observed the 
‘humanising sentiment’ towards military drones during the incident over the Strait of 
Hormuz when a US drone got shot down by Iranian forces (Berlinger, Tawfeeq, Starr et 
al., 2019). At least on the rhetorical level, the US threatened war with Iran due to its 
intervention; suddenly, it would seem that the destruction of a non-human agent has the 
potential to spark a major conflict. The drone serves as a tool, if not an outright agent, of 
the globalization of warfare. Gusterson (2016, p. 119) noted this disturbing aspect with 
an eerie logic:  
 
“If the battlefield exists wherever combatants are located, even if they are remote 
combatants, then drone operators have not entirely removed themselves from the 
battlefield but instead have globalized the battlefield, bringing experiential and 
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organizational fragments of the battlefield inside the national boundaries of the 
homeland.” 
 
To be clear, this paper is not attempting to deny agency of human actants in hybrid 
assemblages. After all, there is still a ‘human’ even in the most radical ‘post-humanism’ 
as Daniel Chernilo (2016) pointed out. As we are on the topic of the globalising hybrid 
proliferation, we may also consider the human aspect of drone hybridity, namely, the 
aspect of the work of the drone operators themselves. While currently the pilots of 
manned aircrafts outnumber their colleagues operating drones, the ratio might soon 
change. It is estimated that by the year 2022 some 85% of all US Air Force pilots will be 
flying drones (Bowman, 2012). The future of military aerospace then seems to be 
dronified, its anthropocentrism receding due to a variety of factors that affect the US 
military’s perception of drones as a dream come true, as we shall see further.  
 
Let me consider some of the actual effects of drone operation upon the human subject 
and indeed upon the very act of killing. The use of drones results in what Sharkey called 
‘moral disengagement’ (2010, p. 371). Such a disengagement is characterised by the 
removal (or at least minimisation) of two fundamental obstacles to killing, one being the 
factor of fear, which practically disappears on the drone operators’ side, and the other 
being the natural human resistance to killing (ibid.). Likewise, two trends can be observed 
here to explain such deconstruction of killing. As a result, the ‘bureaucratisation’ of 
warfare is rapidly accelerating. The routine of a drone operator does not differ much from 
that of an average white-collar worker; warfighting is reduced to office work so 
emblematic of late capitalism (Richardson, 2018, p. 90). It is true that soldiers in this line 
of duty do experience unique stressors (ibid.) that require them to administer killing, but 
at the same time, their day-to-day work experience does not differ much from that of any 
office worker.  
 
Perhaps the most peculiar element of such ‘managerialised’ conduct of warfare is the 
commuting to which the drone operators are subjected to. Drone operators have to 
(tele)commute from their home to a warzone and then back within the same day. Such a 
radical switch without a transition phase eventually produces within soldiers a duality 
within a father ego and a war ego as a coping mechanism for the sheer absurdity of their 
average work day, whereby a soldier may be responsible for killing people thousands of 
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miles away and later attending his son’s soccer practice (Chamayou, 2013, p.119-120). 
The other trend then defines the conduct of drone warfare is that of an increasing 
abstraction, not only of the experience of combat, but also of targeted human beings 
themselves. The act of warfare itself become analogous to the experience of playing a 
videogame. Singer (2009, p. 308-309) cited a drone pilot describing the experience 
fighting thusly: “It’s like a video game. It can get a little bloodthirsty. But it’s fucking 
cool.” Williams (2013) then warned that the sheer distance between the drone operator 
and the target results in the risk of developing a ‘Playstation mentality’ to killing. 
Although Williams approached this problem from the point of geography, we might also 
note that the distance between the operator and the target exists on many more levels that 
just in terms of physical distance. As a result, war is reduced to a literal spectacle for one 
side of the conflict. There is no existential threat for the side advantaged by the use of 
remotely controlled drones; instead, war becomes virtual (Holmqvist, 2013, p. 541). 
Suffice to say, this sense of virtuality is only one sided and wholly different for the other 
side of the conflict as well as for the innocent victims who end up listed as collateral 
damage.  
 
Ultimately, the experience of drone warfare produces a disconnect from the actual killing 
for the operators, which may be a result of the very setting of drone warfare on the ‘home 
front’. Royakkers and van Est (2010) went as far as to label drone operators “cubicle 
warriors”, stating that they are systematically conditioned to view the enemy as a 
subhuman or non-human in order to ease the cognitive dissonance of killing. As indicated 
above, drone operators are aided in this sense by the visual output on their monitors. Some 
compared their targets on the screen to “ants” (Pilkington, 2015). Ultimately though, 
drone operators are not capable of determining the identity of everyone they see from the 
drone’s camera, which is a fact that may account for the disturbing statistic of civilian 
casualty rate caused by drone strikes, which was estimated to be 32% between 2004 and 
2010 (Bergen and Tiedemann, 2010).  
 
As a caveat to the discussion, it may also be noted that the medium of videogames also 
started to explore the phenomenon of the human proclivity to kill and the when faced 
with suitable abstraction and lack of information. In the videogame Spec Ops: The Line 
(2012) the player assumes control of a weapon capable of firing rockets filled with 
phosphorus on targets seen through camera vision similar to that of a drone. After the 
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killing is finished, the player walks through the carnage of burned soldiers until they 
arrive at a piece of scorched earth with a concentration of burned civilian bodies. The 
civilians on the monitor, which appear as white moving figures against grey background 
are virtually indistinguishable from the armed soldiers the player is conditioned by the 
videogame to kill. Hence, dronification of warfare is accompanied by a gamification 
killing.  
 
However, it would be rather simplistic to put the experience of operating a drone on the 
same level as playing a commercial videogame. In reference to the uncanny similarity 
between drone warfare and videogames we should instead stress the ‘immersion’ that 
videogames are capable of, which in turn produces a similar ‘reality-effect’ as operating 
a UAV (Holmqvist, 2013, p. 542). Moreover, the aspect of vision is certainly not 
negligible; drones are instrumental in the formation of contemporary imagery of warfare 
(Jumbert and Sandvik, 2018, p. 29). It could also be argued that drone operators see more 
violence and killing, often in high resolution, than any soldier in the field (Shaw and 
Akhter, 2012, p. 1493). Being integral to the evolving securitization of everyday life, 
drones legitimise their extra-judicial targeted killings by the very vision they offer us, as 
we will discuss in more detail later. The very eye of the drone, the camera that records 
footage of death (much of it being readily available on the internet) dehumanises its 
objects of interest into mere pixels, approachable and comprehensible only by way of 
dismissive analogy.  
 
Dronification of the Commons 
 
If we are now indeed witnessing the trend of ever-increasing dependency on drones, be it 
in the military or in civilian life, we need to ask ourselves what is it that makes drones so 
special, the feature, which makes drone hybridity such a fascinating, if disturbing field of 
study. Drones are in many ways symptomatic of the current era of digitalisation and 
general mass-data dependency. It is fitting then, that drones excel in their capacity of data 
collection. Orend (2013, p. 135-136) cited their use of espionage data together with 
satellite and GPS technology as the main factors that make drones the “smartest”, most 
precise targeting systems yet invented.”  Mark Poster (2004) argued that we are currently 
living in an ‘Information Empire’, which no longer takes the nation state as its point of 
reference but operates on the level of planetary politics. Within drone warfare, spatiality 
 
 34 
and temporality occur in strange dimensions. The drone enables its operator to survey 
land that is thousands of kilometres away. Simultaneously, this information is conveyed 
with only a slight delay in time, which is a deficiency that is continually being improved 
not necessarily to remedy the malfunction of the drone, but the insufficiency of the human 
reflex. The human factor in drone hybridity is thus seen as an obstacle that needs to be at 
the very least minimised to improve the efficiency of drone strikes. 
 
The ability of the military drone to survey territories at extensive distances and at the 
same time to be able to carry out strikes via remote command is a feature that should not 
be mentioned only in passing. It is this feature that allows drones to create the ideal 
containment in the full scale of the term. For Richardson (2018, p. 82), this containment 
signifies a further stage in the “enclosure of the commons”. Such an enclosure is 
characterised by a set of appropriations, confinements and segregations, going much 
farther than simply the fencing off of physical space (Shaw, 2016, p. 6). This line of 
reasoning thus situates the drone on the trajectory of the socio-economic encroachment 
on public space (and property) which Marxists interpret as a key factor in the development 
of feudalism, following the classic account of the enclosure of formerly common 
agricultural land in Great Britain. According to Andrew Murphie (2017, p. 29), what we 
are currently witnessing is the “third enclosure”, by which he means “everything that has 
not already been enclosed” (ibid.). This development follows the first enclosure of public 
land that Marx (1867) identified as a mark of transformation from feudalism to capitalism, 
and the second enclosure of intellectual property through the media revolution (Murphie, 
2017, p. 29). The third enclosure is then characterised by a movement towards algorithmic 
cultures and increasing dependence on artificial intelligence that in turn plays its role in 
ever more present the surveillance and monitoring. Such a dronified third enclosure is no 
longer bound to land or for that matter the very ground, but is ethereal, existing more in 
air and cyberspace down below. Algorithm here does not connote only the mathematical 
process but relates to the more general definition of the term, which could be understood 
as “a procedure, a method, or a list of instructions for solving a problem” (Simonson, 
2011, p. 93). This only goes to show, that by stating that drones operate under the 
guidance of their built-in algorithm, we do not mean that this classifies drones as some 
sort of perfectly rational agents, whose conduct is determined by some sort of ‘objective’ 
mathematical formulas. On the contrary, by the very definition of the algorithm, drones 




Algorithms provide us with complex infrastructures that rely on at times vast quantities 
of data. As such, algorithms present us with high-tech treatment and processing of data, 
which in turn grants military drones the status of cutting-edge technologies, combining 
all the recent innovations of military research. As a result, we encounter yet another 
technological fetish in the conduct of drone warfare; that towards quantifiability, 
predictability and reliability. In short, the fetish for the number, which is inevitably linked 
to the fetish for the machine. Algorithms are supposed to provide us with quantitative, 
calculated data that, as the incredulity towards qualitative assessments would command, 
must be right and true. Naturally, such a state of affairs only exists because it presents the 
public with a convenient, albeit shallow truth. Richardson (2019) summed up the attitude 
of political elites towards algorithmic warfare succinctly: “[…] algorithms appeal to the 
state precisely because they enable the deferral of responsibility, the wiping away of risk, 
the occlusion that comes with computational complexity and technological fetishism.” 
Without any introspection into the actual practice of drone warfare and the continuing 
denial of human agency to decide who lives and dies, it is probable that the trend will 
continue into increasingly inhuman territories of decision-making.  
 
The innovation of drones is responsible for a large set of changes that occur not only in 
the military sector, but essentially in the entirety of society. Of course, the phenomenon 
of the proliferation of formerly military technologies in civilian use is nothing new – the 
internet is one of the most famous examples of such an evolution, together with GPS and 
other technologies. Genealogically speaking, the drone was initially meant to be used 
solely for military purposes and it must be stated that the proliferation of military 
technologies into the civil sector is nothing new, especially if we consider such formerly 
exclusively military technologies that are nowadays used in everyday day life, such as 
satellite navigation or the internet. 
 
 Yet, it would seem that the changes brought on by dronification are more radical than 
mere fluctuation of consumerist trends. Richardson (2018, p. 83) insisted that what we 
are being subjected to nothing short of ‘drone capitalism’, which ensures its precisely by 
the erection of the third enclosure that enables further growth and infiltration. In 
Richardson’s own words (ibid.): “Capitalism intensifies the droneworld; the droneworld 
intensifies capitalism.” As such, the impact of drones corresponds with Nick Srnicek’s 
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assessment of ‘platform capitalism’, which is dependent on the information feedback that 
dronification is so efficient in providing. In Srnicek’s view, platform capitalism always 
seeks its own expansion, it “demands that firms constantly seek out new avenues for 
profit, new markets, new commodities, and new means of exploitation” (2016, p. 3). 
Contrary to popular perception that only sees the physical manifestation of the drone in 
the form of a UAV, the drone hybrid extends into the very function of economy, not as a 
metaphor, but as a concrete process of data treatment, surveillance and ultimately 
intervention.  
 
The drone effectively functions as a signifier. Certain scholars understood the wider 
importance of the abstraction of the drone as an object and commented on the associated 
properties that make drone what it is. Andrejevic (2016, p. 21), for example, approached 
the drone from the point of what he called ‘drone logic’, that he defined as “the 
deployment of ubiquitous, always on networked sensors for the purposes of automated 
data collection, processing, and response.” Hence, the physical manifestation of the drone 
as a war machine is only its most apparent form. Nonetheless, it is specifically this form 
that raises the greatest amount of controversy in the public discourse. As Richardson 
(2018, p. 89-90) further stressed: “the military drone is perhaps the purest physical 
manifestation of enclosure to date.” The military drone is recognisable not just by its 
appearance, but also by the distinctive ‘buzzing’ it produces, which led Hashim and Patte 
(2012, p. 8) to remark somewhat prosaically: “These days the last sound a terrorist often 
hears is a distinctive buzz of an armed drone above him before it fires the missile that 
kills him – and many unfortunate civilians.”  
 
The characteristic noise of the drone also adds a further layer to its hybrid 
identity; reportedly, militants colloquially refer to military drones as machay, or “wasps” 
precisely for their aggressive buzzing before or after they strike (Bergen and Tiedemann, 
2011, p. 16). Ironically enough, the drone assumes an insectoid image (the very term 
‘drone’ originates in fact from drone bees which shared similar appearance with the early 
drone prototypes), much like the targets it perceives through its gaze. The gaze of the 
drone has such a critical importance because of its capability to radically transform the 
landscapes it surveys. What manufacturers sell the military is, in a very real sense, the 
technological power to create specific spatial and temporal zones (Richardson, 2018, p. 
90) of incipient violence. In drone warfare, the dynamic differentials of the techno-
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affective become techniques of violence on the verge of happening: the complex system 
of the drone apparatus harnesses human and nonhuman processes of monitoring that are 
always geared towards the outbreak of violence in one form or another (ibid.).In the next 
chapter, we will explore the connections between human and non-human actors and their 
relevance to drone warfare using Actor Network Theory (ANT).  
 
Chapter three: Decentring Human Agency  
 
The purpose of ANT is in inquire how particular elements are brought together into stable 
assemblages that, in combination, produce specific actions (Bourne, 2012, p. 157). This 
is especially pertinent when considering the extensive infrastructure and the de-facto 
relocation of war into office space in the age of drone warfare. To be clear, it is quite a 
difficult task to exactly demarcate what ANT ‘is’; rather, we may engage with the theory 
and its toolbox through relations the study of relations (Michael, 2016, p. 5). Nonetheless, 
the foundation of ANT lies in its focus on the non-human in the production of the social 
(ibid. p. 12) and furthermore, in the assertion that society emerges as a flat network of 
associations among actants, which are quantitative and not qualitative (ibid. p. 12). 
Agents, or actants, are the products of networks rather than essentialist givens. Despite 
its apparent utility in the assessment of the interconnectedness of human and non-human 
actors, ANT continues to be viewed with varying degrees of suspicion by the academic 
and scientific community, ranging from subtle jabs at the premise of the theory (Kanger, 
2017) to outright dismissal of the ANT’s very foundation (Collins and Yearley, 1992). 
Among the criticisms of ANT, the concern with amorality is persistent due to the 
assumption that equalising social relations among all actors risks the devaluation of 
humans (Winner, 1993). Winner even went as far as to claim that social constructivism 
on the whole is elitist in nature as it favours certain social interests over others (ibid.). On 
the other side of the spectrum of this 1990’s debate were scholars such as Bijker (1993) 
who claimed that the social constructivist debate does not automatically imply an amoral 
stance. With the emergence of science studies, Bijker’s view seems to be gaining more 
and more ground in the scholastic circles, as it allows for a much more encompassing 
view of science one would be tempted to say ‘done right’. We may also take into account 
that the argument for strict moral separation between humans and non-humans and the 
labelling of any attempt to subvert this dogma as ‘amoral’ or ‘dehumanising’ returns us 
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back to a rather simplistic realism that refuses to engage the questions and challenges of 
the present day, when the division of the human and non-human is ever more porous. 
 
However, in relation to our study of drone hybridity and its consequences for the human 
subject in the field of security, perhaps the most relevant contribution to this discussion 
is that of Susan L. Star (1990). Star explored the issues of heterogeneity and 
multivocality, going as far as to develop the theory of multiple membership, which 
stipulates that any actor can be simultaneously present in multiple networks. As a result, 
a ‘high tension zone’ emerges, which Star describes as a “zero point between 
dichotomies” (ibid. p. 47). Is this not the very ambiguity of drone warfare? The military 
drone is a high-tension zone of not only one, but multiple dichotomies, it is in a very 
practical sense dismantling the binary divisions of human/machine and peace/war. Star’s 
argument follows that the end product of this multiplicity can be monstrosity (ibid. p. 30), 
due to the multiple personalities that tend to arise from the exposure to violence and 
torture. In this regard, Star’s thesis (albeit perhaps unwittingly) lay the ground for the 
development of the contemporary thinking about drone warfare. After all, does not the 
very fact that a drone operator come back to his family after a shift of remote-controlled 
bombardment attest to the existence of a actor-network that is in its very essence 
monstrous? 
 
The Resurgence of Dingpolitik 
 
In this analysis of drone warfare, we can employ Latour’s (2005, p. 4-7) notion of 
‘Dingpolitik’, which attributes political agency to things (or objects) that were previously 
thought to be apolitical, or devoid of political agency. Dingpolitik, translatable roughly 
as ‘thing-politics’, or even ‘politics of things’, seeks to arrive at a greater level of 
understanding of political reality than realism ever could. As Bruno Latour (ibid. p. 14) 
eloquently put it: “In general, to invoke “realism” when talking about politics is 
something one should not do without trembling and shaking.” Latour then seeks to 
transform the static matters of fact into matters of dispute and concern in order to arrive 
at ‘object-oriented politics’.  
 
According to Dingpolitik, objects themselves then possess the capability to affect 
interactions, including human interactions with them, and in doing so, become ‘things’ 
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with their own scripts and instructions. Once again, drone warfare provides us with a 
drastic reality check when it comes to concepts that may otherwise appear rather abstract 
and theoretical, thus validating Latour’s asserting that Dingpolitik is concerned with 
reality much more than Realpolitik ever hoped to. Appropriately enough, the discussion 
surrounding the materiality of drones is not limited only to drones themselves, which on 
their own may be regarded as a rather niche area of study, but also questions our 
understanding of war itself. A synergy is emerging in academic literature between the 
insights of ANT and IR, which constitutes a development that tends to be termed the 
‘materialist turn’ in the discipline (Schandorf and Karatzogianni, 2018). The materialist 
turn has also achieved considerable traction in the area of Critical Security Studies. 
 
 The drone is then to be regarded as an actant, being able to affect its interactions with 
humans and the results of these interactions. Drone warfare is still a relatively new 
phenomenon and as such, the ANT scholarship attempting to situate it within a network 
of relations is still forming. Yet, insights of ANT seem to be perfectly compatible with 
the emerging understanding of drone warfare and its ethical and political implications, 
especially if we accept the notion that non-human objects can indeed be actants. Of 
particular interest then may be the question of materiality of drones; after all, drones are 
not merely passive matter, but active hybrid actants in given actor networks. At the same 
time, however, we need to restrain from humanising or even fetishising the drone actant. 
Drone themselves are, after all, not composed of organic matter, but they are constituted 
by what Holmqvist (2013) called ‘steely bodies’. Material agency then arises as an 
intriguing, if not disturbing, area of study, particularly when we consider the morbid 
actor-networks of modern military-industrial killing at large distances.  
 
As discussed above, the more human agents depend on the use of robotic warfare, the 
more we stray from the conventional understanding of the supposed instrumentality of 
drones. Yet, the fetishism towards drone technologies persists and while this may be 
especially true for the US military, the trend is also observable in the civilian public too. 
As Rothstein (2011) articulated the drone fetish well when he stated: “You are obsessed 
with drones. We all are. We live in a drone culture just as we once lived in a car culture.” 
Drone fetishisation in fact occurs on multiple levels, affecting the machine and the pilot 
alike, thus reinforcing the hybrid link in the assemblage. Bentley (2018) noted how 
fetishisation extends to the drone operator because of the discourse surrounding the ‘stoic 
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warrior’ (Sherman, 2005) that is deliberately created by the US military and politicians. 
The reasoning of this official discourse is built on the premise that drone warfare leaves 
no negative traces on US military personnel because there is no need for soldiers to be 
physically present on the battlefield. Naturally, the claim that drone warfare is somewhat 
sanitised of the ‘negative’ aspects of war begins to crumble once one considers the 
pervasive rates of PTSD among drone pilots (ibid. p. 96). Drone operators themselves 
are, after all, human beings, but that does not mean that their participation in the hybrid 
assemblage, which tends to inherently dehumanise all it see, can have detrimental effects 
because of the radical separation from reality it induces. 
 
Admittedly, dingpolitik is still a rather new approach to materiality and politics, but then 
again, the drone is an emergent object that challenges anthropocentric bias present in 




The question of drone hybridity inevitably brings to mind the question of drone agency. 
More specifically, the discourse accumulated around drone warfare tends to collapse into 
the clash of materialist and sociological perspectives. Where the materialist perspective 
emphasizes the role of the material object in the act of killing, the sociological view 
prioritizes human actors and the institutions surrounding them. A renowned account of 
this dialectic is that of Latour’s ‘gunman’ (1999). Latour argued that instead of trying to 
shift responsibility on either extreme with arguments pointing at some sort of 
‘transformation’ of either the non-human object, or the human actor, we should focus on 
the very bond between these two seemingly isolated entities. The combination of the 
human and non-human elements then results in the literal semiotic hybrid of the 
‘gunman’. The dualism of the human and non-human has of course been extensively 
covered in frequently heated debated – one can read the account of Collins and Yearley 
(1992) who labelled ANT a “post-relativist position” and dismissed its attempt at treating 
all actants that are “party to the scientific enterprise” in the same manner. It is not the 
ambition of this paper to provide a full length literature review of this admittedly still 
ongoing debate, rather, I would like to follow John Law’s stream of thought that argues 




Yet, it would be a mistake to blunder into the same errors that traditional approaches to 
International Relations do when it comes down to holistic assessment of agency. Indeed, 
the materialist perspectives are not without flaws and at times tend to simply attribute 
agency to a higher-order actor, such as the system or the assemblage (Schandorf and 
Karatzogianni, 2018, p. 90-91). Similarly, anthropocentric and state-centric approaches 
rely in their assumptions on the power to act meaningfully of rational actors or on the 
treatment of states as actors (ibid.). Indeed, our exploration of hybrids has to explore their 
participation in assemblages without simplifying such complex networks into hierarchies. 
While post-human perspectives in IR are still only a relatively recent development, the 
same cannot be said of the ‘materialist turn’- Indeed, its intellectual history can be traced 
to Deleuze and Guattari with their specific concept of the ‘assemblage’, in particular the 
notion of the “collective assemblage of enunciation” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, p. 80). 
At this most basic level, such an assemblage contains properties that only emerge from 
out of interactions among its constituent components, which are in turn bound to each 
other by desire (Schandorf and Karatzogianni, 2018, p. 92). Such a conceptualisation truly 
laid the groundworks for the successive developments not only in International Relations, 
as I have discussed in this paper, but perhaps even more importantly in social theory. Of 
course, Deleuze and Guattari most probably did not have military drones in mind when 
they were writing A Thousand Plateaus and their view of assemblages is rather optimistic 
in its outlook. The duo saw sets of social being (the human and non-human components 
of assemblages) as having the potential to subvert the ‘societies of control’, which 
continuously deform the flows of desire (Yu, 2013, p. 197). In the case of drone warfare, 
however, assemblages are grotesque in their constitution, being motivated by an inherent 
death drive more than anything else, a desire to survey and kill.  
 
To acknowledge the material agency of drones is to acknowledge drones as actants, which 
subsequently leads us to a narrower discussion of technological agency. Leander (2013, 
p. 815) investigated such technological agency with the controversial aspect of extra-
judicial drone killings in mind, stating that: “Even if a technology has an origin and was 
intended for a particular purpose, this does not confine it to that origin or that purpose.” 
In a Deleuzian fashion, technologies spread rhizomatically, they feed into assemblages 
and create new hybrids. Latour’s work on fetishes (2010) also shines some light on how 
material agency is not derived from an object’s origin, but from its implementation in 
social practices, which eventually results in the formation of fetish. This can be seen in 
 
 42 
the case of drones, whose original purpose for mere surveillance and reconnaissance and 
whose development and funding skyrocketed only after the innovations that enabled 
drones to kill. Leander (2013) even went as far as to conclude that not only do drones 
have the agency to define who is and who is not a legal expert by defining associations 
with emergent fields of expertise and creating technological expert roles, but that the 




When it comes to drones then, it is important to abandon the classic way of thinking about 
weapons as mere instruments of human will and control. Drones deconstruct the very 
binary of subject and object, they defy their assigned instrumental role and in doing so, 
approach the ideal hybrids. As a matter of fact, while it may be radical enough to assign 
drones the role of actors, their true role in the assemblage of warfare is admittedly more 
complex than that. Indeed, the exact status of drones may ultimately be left unclear due 
to not only their position as ‘humachines’ but also due to the proliferation of algorithms 
that act as intermediaries. In fact, it is precisely these governing algorithms and not 
necessarily the element of human control (which is increasingly debatable anyway) that 
largely make the drone a drone. Valentin Rauer (2016, p. 152) aptly summarised the 
complicated status of drones in actor networks thusly: “Seen as actants, drones create a 
fuzzily defined actor network that extends from one continent to another and enables 
states to act micro-globally.” While the description ‘micro-globally’ might have appeared 
as an oxymoron before the inception of drone warfare, Rauer is very much on point in his 
analysis when he spots the collapsing conception of spatiality in drone warfare. Seen from 
the perspective of ANT, drones complicate the terms ‘Actor’ and ‘Network’ by their very 
definition, or rather, they radicalize the theoretical potential of ANT. The rapid 
development of drone technologies shrinks the globe into a single battlefield, traversed 
by non-human killing agents, death machines in the literal sense.  
 
The role of the algorithm in the act of drone-administered killing is a problematic one and 
further adds to the perplexity that arises from our tendency to simplify the world into 
binary oppositions. Schandorf and Karatzogianni (2018, p. 94-95) sought to deconstruct 
the traditional binaries such as the division between material/immaterial by drawing a 




“Where motivation is inherently rhetorical and affective, an inevitably embodied, 
affective force or capacity grounded in symbolic social identifications, intentionality is a 
programmatic, even algorithmic, goal-oriented force or tendency characterizing any 
agent, human or otherwise, pursuing a set of outcomes and having an influence on other 
agents in its world.“ 
 
The military drone thus defies binarism and in doing so, it affirms its hybrid status. It 
would be a mistake then to think of drones only as conventional weapons on an imaginary 
empirical trajectory. Jumbert and Sandvik (2018, p. 29) rejected Leander’s simplification 
of actants into simply “things” with “agency” (Leander, 2013, p. 813), instead opting for 
the conception of drones as “technologies”, or more precisely, as “artefacts”. This enables 
us to better grasp the materiality of the drone, as well as its interconnectedness with 
human agency. Ultimately, we return to the debates surrounding drone autonomy. Yet, it 
would seem that the assessment of the materiality of drones requires a new approach 
rather than that of the inconclusive rational individualism, one that would be more 
informed by the apparently still too recent insights of phenomenology and ANT. Drone 
warfare breaks down the entrenched binary distinctions between subject and objects due 
to the very process of dronification. The drone’s gaze does not set it apart from its 
environment as some sort of robotic voyeur, no the contrary, the drone becomes part of 
the observed environment. Holmqvist (2013, p. 544) drew on the phenomenology of 
Merleau-Ponty by drawing a parallel between drone warfare and the seer/seen 
relationship. The two are thus not separate from each other, but bound together, or as 
Homlqvist (ibid.) put it, the drone presents us with the figure of the ‘seer’: “in the form 
of a seeing individual, a ‘seer’ who can never be distinguished from what he ‘sees’.” The 
drone manifests itself as this archetypal figure, no longer as a robotic piece of machinery, 
but as a fully-fledged assemblage. 
 
To further continue in the line of thought indicated by ANT, we must not fall into the trap 
of ‘humanising’ the non-human agent. To state that drones possess some degree 
autonomy that they derive from their algorithmic agency does not mean that one 
acknowledges drones as ‘imperfect humans’, actors which share certain qualities with 
humans but lack others. The drone, in many ways more so than the obedient robot, 
presents the human actor with the ‘other’, whereby the human actor projects itself into 
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the non-human drone due to the drone’s faculty of agency. Oddly enough, the ‘otherness’ 
of drones seems to be extremely under-reported in academic literature. Rauer (2016, p. 
153) then raises a crucial point: “[algorithmic] agency should not be confused with the 
cultural imaginings born of human free will, intentionality, creativity, and freedom.” The 
drone’s materiality is no longer merely instrumental but calls into serious question the 
validity of the anthropocentrism of social sciences. If we indeed accept the notion that 
material non-human objects possess agency, then we reconsider the very concept of 
political agency. Such a political agency, however, is more and more shaped by non-
humans than by humans. There is indeed something eerie about the way how military 
drones have come to signify incoming annihilation, when the decisions to extinguish 
human lives are not even fully taken and orchestrated by human agents. Killing is being 
outsourced to the algorithm.  
 
Although the concept of weaponized algorithms may sound to some like science fiction, 
it is nonetheless a development that is well underway. Algorithms do not follow any 
moral imperatives, they do not have any in-built system of ethics, like the drone, the 
algorithm feels no empathy. For the drone as for the algorithm, there is no ‘fellow 
neighbour’, there is only observed and calculable data. By no means is this a 
metaphor; under the drone gaze, human lives are abstracted into quantifiable data. 
Pugliese (2016) perhaps phrased it better when he stated that what we are witnessing is 
“death by metadata.” He too was not exaggerating in his statement; US drone operators 
routinely rely on metadata to determine what targets to eliminate on their kill-lists without 
using human intelligence to confirm the target’s identity (ibid.). In drone warfare, there 
are two kinds of strikes. First, there are the so-called personality strikes, where the target’s 
identity is known, and then there are the signature strikes, where patterns of behaviour 
are employed to determine the target (Keene, 2015, p. 25).  
 
As can be intuited, the latter variety is the one more disturbing, especially once we take 
into account the fact that in such a case, drones follow the conclusions of the ‘pattern of 
life’ analysis. Drones acquire data through surveillance and reconnaissance in order to 
effectively build up the human target from scratch; the terrorist is assembled by the 
algorithmic sorting protocol. The data in question does not of course come only from 
literal stalking of individuals with the use of camera, but also from voice recordings and 
localizations though cell phone tracking. Without any deeper reason, an innocent 
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individual may be killed simply for making a call from the ‘wrong’ phone. As Pugliese 
(2014, p. 3) further observed the shocking reality: “a human subject becomes effectively 
indistinguishable from their mobile phone.” The data has no body, no face, it is ethereal, 
lacking context, and in its transformation into metadata, it loses content too. The human 
being is abstracted into a pattern of numerals that is incompatible with life; it is dronified, 
no longer human. 
 
With such processes in mind, it is hard to argue that the human is still the ‘measure of all 
things.’ If we contend that drone-administered and drone-decided killings are indeed the 
results of state sovereignty, then do we not admit that such a concept is in essence wholly 
arbitrary, masking its wantonness under the veneer of ‘hard data’? Let us come back 
momentarily to the idea of the ‘pattern of life’, constructed by the dronified algorithms. 
The warrant to kill a target from above in practice is not determined by what the target 
has done (as would be the case in a ‘personality strike’), but by the target’s behaviour and 
identification. Chamayou (2015, p. 145) expressed the sentiment aptly: “[…] your pattern 
of life might suggest a 70 percent chance that you are a militant, in other words a 
combatant, and we accordingly have the right to kill you.” It is no wonder then, that the 
US representatives claim that drones display unprecedented levels of precision.  
Conclusion 
 
This diploma thesis attempted to reconcile the modern status of state sovereignty with the 
current practise of drone warfare. As drones are fundamentally hybrid actors, our 
understanding of state sovereignty can no longer rest on the old realist anthropocentric 
notions, which also prioritise states as the central actors in International Relations. 
Realism deserves critique perhaps more than its successive discursive perspectives, 
because its anthropocentrism and state-centrism form the foundation for much of the field 
of Security Studies and the wider area of International Relations.  
 
Much like other major military inventions and innovations in history, drones mark a 
milestone on the imaginary timeline of warfare. What makes war drones a particularly 
fascinating area of study is the sheer formality of the killings they administer. Drones fall 
into multiple grey zones of categorization at once, which in turn makes their hybridity 
stand out all that much more. As a result, new approaches to security such as post-
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humanism and Actor-Network Theory become absolutely necessary for a comprehensive 
understanding of drone warfare. At the same time, further research may vindicate some 
of the theoretical premises of the realist school of thought, which this paper otherwise 
critiques for its continuing and largely unaddressed dependence on anthropocentrism and 
state-centrism.  
 
This is particularly true when it comes to one of the central interests of this paper, which 
is state sovereignty. The use of drone warfare distorts state sovereignty into a grotesque 
shape; as long as drones are used to administer killings in the remote regions of allegedly 
terrorist infested lands, then power can be dished out in an entirely arbitrary manner. The 
casual ease with which drone strikes are approved and even promoted, particularly by the 
US military, can be at times staggering. Drones create literal ‘enclosures’ where anything 
goes, where human beings are denied not only their basic human rights (which the 
architects of the War on Terror claim to promote), but their very humanity. This 
disturbing phenomenon formed my interest in the necropolitical research of drones, 
which in turned linked back to my post-human investigation of drone agency. Drones are 
situated in a tangle of agencies and that is why this paper refrained from trying to answer 
the recurring ethical question of who or what is exactly responsible for drone killings. 
Yet, what I was able to conclude through this research was the increasing marginalisation 
of the human element. Human fallibility is increasingly seen as a liability by the US 
military, a liability that can be rectified by further innovations in drone technologies. With 
such mindset in place, a continual increase in drone autonomy is to be expected, maybe 
to such a point where the human involvement will one day be of only symbolic and 
ceremonial value.  
 
In many respects, specifically the hybridity of drones is still little understood and its 
impacts on human life extend rather into the field of ethics than political science. It is 
perhaps this post-human dimension of drones that so far eludes a precise classification, 
an overarching conceptualisation of the drone as a hybrid. All the trends indicate that the 
following decades will play out in the sign of the drone. As I established in the course of 
this paper, drones are not merely objects flying in the skies, nor are they only a mark on 
the empirical development of weaponry. Drones are the symptoms of a wider process of 
dronification, whose pervasiveness is only going to increase in the coming years. The 
civilian side of dronification would provide enough material for a wholly separate work 
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and if this paper discusses matters that diverge from the strictly military use of drones, it 
is only in the hope of demonstrating the constantly expanding domain and understanding 
of security.  
 
I have to strongly emphasise that this paper does not seek to demonise or denigrate the 
operators of military drones or other technical personnel that is required for their proper 
functioning. Drone operators may not be involved in direct combat on the battlefield, but 
their high rates of PTSD and susceptibility to suicidal tendencies are an under-reported 
but serious issue. Instead, my goal for to comment and critique the very phenomenon of 
drone strikes, to which drone operators may unwittingly fall victim themselves, as well 
as to situate this practice within the existing discourse of Security Studies. Drones perhaps 
truly are the ideal hybrids, in the sense that their hybridity is convoluted to such an extent 
that we are no longer sure how to dissect their constituent elements into human and non-
human parts.  
Summary  
 
This paper explored the link between the concept of sovereignty, as it has been presented 
by the realist school of thought, and the reality of modern drone warfare. Sovereignty, 
albeit still a relevant concept, is undergoing a transformation. It is increasingly affected 
by hybrid actors and networks, of which military drones are the prime example. In this 
turn towards hybridity, the old assumption of anthropocentrism and state-centrism, which 
realism takes for granted in its analysis, begin to fade away. 
 
The first chapter thus investigated the conceptualisation of sovereignty and provided a 
critique of the existing realist and neo-realist discourses. Security Studies and 
International Relations would greatly benefit from paying greater attention to emergent 
schools of thought, such as post-humanism, whose insights seem to be more in line with 
the contemporary practise of hybridity. The second chapter then dealt with the socio-
technic implications of drone warfare. Military drones can be seen as being necropolitical 
agents in their function. As such, military drones as hybrids contradict the the 
anthropocentric approaches as the human involvement in drone-administered killing is in 
decline. The increasing autonomy of the fetishized military drone places the hybrid in the 
forefront of the decision-making regarding who has to die so that others may live. As a 
result, dronification occurs, which is a process that simplifies complex reality into data to 
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be assessed by algorithms and which in turn produces interventions based on such 
discriminatory assessments. The third chapter dealt mostly with the potential of the Actor-
Network Theory in the analysis of drone warfare. New materialist approaches such as 
dingpolitik were explored, further undermining the realist paradigms. The role of 
algorithms in drone warfare was too indicated and examined in as far as it pertains to the 
act of killing by a military drone. 
 
Under the influence of drone warfare, state sovereignty is returning to a more arbitrary 
form, where killing is licensed by the dependence on supposedly precise targeting 
technologies. In reality, however, hybrid actors, such as drones, present us with 
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